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Global Recession and the National System of Innovation in China:  
‘A Blessing in Disguise’? 
 
Ju Liu*, Angathevar Baskaran**, and Mammo Muchie***  
 
 
Abstract  
Since the early 1990s China’s economy has emerged one of the leading 
economies in the world due to factors such as judicial mix of policies of 
economic liberalisation and protection, and the process of globalisation driven 
by the information and communication technologies (ICT) revolution, which 
brought closer the national economies across the globe as never before. China’s 
national system of innovation (NSI) has been evolving and has been adapting to 
the challenges posed particularly by the phenomenon of globalisation. China has 
benefitted significantly from the global economic boom driven by the 
globalisation and its economy has registered consistently GDP growth of over 
10% since 2002 until the onset of global recession in 2008. The recession has 
slowed down the economy in every country in the world including China, 
triggered by the global credit crunch and slow down of trade. Major economies 
across the world have introduced a series of measures in response to recession 
and to stem the tide of its negative impacts. These measures included: bank 
bailouts, rescue packages, fiscal stimuli, and, most crucially, monetary easing. 
Even with all these measures, we would argue that, some countries are likely to 
be affected more severely than others due to the differences in individual 
characteristics of their NSIs. That is, the recession is likely to have varying 
impacts in varying degrees on different economies in the world due to the 
differences among their NSIs. 
 
In the case of China, to reduce the negative impacts of the global recession, it 
announced a fiscal stimulus package of $586b (14 per cent of GDP) in 
November 2008. This measure aimed to stimulate during 2009-10 the domestic 
demand by reducing taxes, investing in public infrastructure, and promoting 
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activities in the areas such as health care and education, agriculture, low-income 
housing, water, electricity, transportation, environment, and technological 
innovation. It is also designed to boost the income of the poor. In this context, 
we wish to investigate the following research questions: 1. How did the 
strengths and weakness of NSI help or hinder in coping with the adverse effects 
of the recession in China? and conversely  2. What are the impacts of recession 
on the NSI in China? By employing secondary and descriptive data we attempt 
to investigate these questions.  
 
It appears that China is the least affected emerging market by the global 
recession mainly due to the inherent strength of its NSI. Also, it appears that 
China has decided to use the global recession as an opportunity rather than an 
obstacle and as ‘blessing in disguise’ to introduce changes and re-engineer its 
economy and NSI.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The current global recession triggered by the sub-prime mortgage market in the 
United States (US) in 2007 set snowballing effect on national economies around 
the globe, affecting almost every country in varying degrees and at varying time. 
The multinational institutions such as the United Nations (UN), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have the world economic growth 
would be severely affected in 2008-2009. Developing countries are likely to be 
affected by lower demand for exports, reduced commodity prices, reduced 
capital inflows, delayed investments, and exchange rate volatility (United 
Nations 2009; AfDB et al, 2008, Economic Commission for Africa, 2008). This 
became the reality as countries started experiencing the impact of global 
recession from the second half of 2008. Also, since mid-2008 commodity prices 
have dropped sharply due to weakened demand.  
 
The likely nature and shape of impact of the recession on the emerging 
economies such as China and India and other developing countries have 
generated considerable interest among the world multilateral institutions such 
the UN and IMF and scholars. There seems to be a consensus that among the 
developing and emerging economies some countries will be affected the most 
severely than others due to economy-specific factors and characteristics. For 
example, in the banking/ financial sector which triggered the credit crunch in the 
developed economies which in turn accelerated the recession it is argued that the 
emerging economies such as BRICS would not be affected to the extent of 
developed economies. At the same time it is also argued that there are 
significant differences in the impact on even the banking/financial sectors 
among the BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
There were other reports and writings focussing on particularly China and 
suggesting that its economy might not be affected seriously by the global 
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recession. For example, a study by Credit Suisse has shown that China is least 
affected by the credit crunch, and India is facing domestic liquidity problem 
(Financial Chronicle, 9 December 2008). This caught our attention and we came 
up with the argument that this is because of the nature and distinct 
characteristics of China’s NSI. That is, we propose to examine how far the 
relative strength or weakness of the NSI in China has influenced the nature and 
shape of the impact of global recession on its economy. We employ secondary 
and descriptive data to analyse this. Our research would contribute in two ways: 
first, it provides a heuristic conceptual framework linking NSI and the impact of 
global recession and second, it illustrates how China’s NSI is influencing and 
being influenced by the global recession. 
 
The paper is structured as following: section 2 presents a conceptual framework 
to link and analyse the NSI and its potential influence on the impact of global 
recession; section 3 presents the case of China’s NSI and China’s response to 
global recession, section 4 provides data analysis employing the conceptual 
framework, and section 5 presents our conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. NSI and its potential influence on the impact of recession: a conceptual 
framework 
A system of innovation, in general, brings together all the significant economic, 
social, political, organisational, institutional and other factors and their 
interactions and influences the development, diffusion, and application of 
innovations. Though interest in the innovation systems approach have grown 
since the 1980s, its origin dates back to the nineteenth century catch up 
aspirations of economies like that of Germany with Britain. 
 
Although Friedrich List (1856) and his concept national production system may 
be seen as the historical origin of the national system of innovation (Freeman, 
1995), according to Bengt-Åke Lundvall, the modern version of the concept 
appeared first in an unpublished contribution to OECD by Freeman (1982). 
Since then, it has evolved over the years (e.g. Freeman, 1987, 1995; Lundvall, 
1985, 1988, 1992, 2007; Nelson, 1993; and Edquist, 1997). Although NSI 
concept was used mainly in the context of developed economies, increasingly it 
began to be used to study developing countries (e.g. Fang, 1997; Cimoli, 2000; 
Liu，2006；Lian, 2006; Intarakumnerd and Chaaminade, 2007); Intarakumnerd 
and Chaaminade, 2007). Also, there have been attempts to broaden NSI 
approach to study the problems and challenges of development and 
underdevelopment (e.g. Muchie et al., 2003). Thus, NSI provides the conceptual 
approach or framework for studying both developed and developing economies 
at various stages of development. We adopt NSI conceptual framework to 
investigate the degree to which different BRICS countries with differing levels 
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of  NSI strength and weakness cope in mitigating some of the adverse impacts of 
the recession. This is done by first identifying those elements of NSI which 
could have significant impact on the effectiveness of recession. 
 
Lundvall (2007, p. 102) argued that NSI concept can be employed at two levels: 
(i) the ‘core’ - “firms in interaction with other firms and with the knowledge 
infrastructure” including universities; and (ii) ‘wider setting’ that includes 
“national education systems, labour markets, financial markets, intellectual 
property rights, competition in product markets and welfare regimes”. In the 
‘wider setting’ the government plays a major role in a number of ways. We 
would argue that in the narrow sense NSI involves a system of interaction of a 
wide variety of public and/ or private firms with other institutions such as 
universities, and government agencies -- all working together towards attaining 
the production and diffusion of knowledge and science, technology, and 
innovation within the boundaries of legally recognised states. The form of the 
interaction can take both technical and non-technical dimensions. It could be 
organisational, institutional, commercial, physical, human, mental, legal, social, 
and financial interactions. The broader goal of such interactions is the socio-
economic development, regulation, and support for new science, technology, 
innovation within the country by dealing with and responding to both internal 
and external challenges. For this study, we employ the NSI concept in its wider 
setting. 
 
Baskaran and Muchie (2009, 2010) formulated a conceptual framework derived 
from the wealth of literature discussed above to investigate how and to what 
degree differing levels of NSI strength and weakness in different BICS 
economies and selected Asian economies coped in mitigating some of the 
adverse impacts of the recession. In this paper we have adopted the same NSI 
conceptual framework to study the case of China more in depth. Baskaran and 
Muchie identified four key sets of elements of NSI. 1. The first set Conceptual 
Framing involves the ideas and policies that frame the overall scope or possible 
set of interactions of politics, economics and knowledge. The behaviour and 
interactions are often shaped by sets of common habits, norms, routines, 
established practices, rules, or laws. 2. The second set involves Institutions, 
Technologies, and Knowledge and their co-evolution which enable 
implementation of the conceptual framing and policies selected above (the first 
set) and to build an efficient innovation system. 3. The third set involves the 
means provided to the institutions (second set) for realising the goals set (first 
set), that is, various incentives such as financial and social rewards. It is vital to 
foster appropriate incentive system. If the incentive system is inappropriate or 
fails to command wider acceptance, the opportunity to organise robust NSI and 
achieve measurable results will be put in jeopardy. 4. The fourth set highlights 
the overall efficiency of the environment for learning in terms of 
 5
implementation, monitoring, review, and feedback involving the above three 
sets.  
Figure 1: Four Major Sets of Elements of National System of Innovation (NSI) 
NSI
Strong/ W eak Linkages between
 Different Elements Resulting in:
1. Well Developed NSI, or  
2. Learning/ Transition NSI, or 
3. Nascent/ Very Weak NSI 
 Elements Set 1:
Conceptual Framing
How economics and politics are 
co-governed and/or co-evolved.
Articulating the interaction among 
Government action, Industrial 
production, and Knowledge creation. 
 Elements Set 2:
  Institutions, Industry, Technologies, 
and Knowledge
Need strong interaction, linkages, 
synergies, and co-ordination between 
these to achieve more efficient 
innovation system. 
  Elements Set 4: 
Implementation/
 Learning O utcomes and Changes 
Implementation of policies and 
programs should include feedback. 
Ability to learn and take corrective 
measures are imperative. 
Learning outcomes could lead to 
different types of socio-economic 
changes
  Elements Set 3:
 Incentives,  Investment and 
Infrastructure: 
These  lead to co-evolutionary dynamics 
between Institution, Technology, and 
Knowledge production by linking 
economic and non-economic agents.
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 2
Institutions and Relations
Domestic market/ Structure,
Domestic and Foreign Firms, 
Universities, Public R&D 
Organizations, Financial Institutions, 
University-Public R&D Relations, 
Transnational Networks.
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 2
Industry, Technologies and 
Knowledge
Different/ Diversified industrial 
sectors, Education system, Human 
resources development, and Skills/ 
Labor flexibility and mobility. 
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 3
Incentives
Economic and Regulatory Incentives: Export 
related, Trade and Tax policies, Return on 
R&D investment, Appropriability through 
Intellectual Property, Competitive Market and 
Pricing.
Economic and Regulatory Incentives:  Public 
funding with Intellectual Property, i. e. 
Industry-Government research partnership, 
Regulatory standards to drive innovations.
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 3
Investment &  Infrastructure
 Public & Private Investment, Venture Capital, and 
Foreign Direct Investment.
Macro-economic & Fiscal Policy, Science and 
Technology Policy, Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR), Government R&D support, ICT 
Infrastructure.
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The learning outcomes can be different such as transformative, adaptive, 
corrective, modifying, evolutionary, and so on. This can also be negative.  
 
The relationships between these four sets of elements that constitute NSI are 
illustrated by Figure 1.  
 
Table 1: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on 
Recession 
Components of NSI that could Impact on 
Recession 
Related to the Elements of NSI 
(As shown in Figure 1) 
1. The general investment climate and economic 
policy framework:  
 
(a)Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate, and Exchange rate  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
NSI Elements Set 3 and components: 
Investment & Infrastructure, and Incentives 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings:  
 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings growth 
 
NSI Elements Sets 2 and components: 
Institutions and Relations  
3. Industrial structure:  
 
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign financial 
market 
 
NSI Elements Sets 2 and Set 3 and 
components:  
Institutions, Investment & Infrastructure, and 
Incentives 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
 
NSI Elements Set 2 and components: 
Institutions, Industry Sectors, Technologies 
and Knowledge 
5. Foreign Trade: 
 
(a) Nature of exports/ Imports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
NSI Elements Set 2 and Set 3 and 
components: 
Industry, Technologies and Knowledge; and 
Incentives 
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
NSI Elements Set 2 and Set 3 and 
components: Industry, Technologies and 
Knowledge; and Incentives 
 
 7
Among the four sets of elements, there are two sets which are relevant to 
making linkages and relations between NSI and recession, namely Set 2 
(Institutions, Industry, Technologies and Knowledge), and Set 3 (Incentives, 
Investment and Infrastructure). While we capture the importance of set 1 and set 
4 in our NSI conceptual framework, we focus more in depth on set 2 and set 3, 
as these sets illustrates more concretely the inter-relationship between various 
actors and means necessary to build an efficient innovation system to cope with 
recession. The strong presence and interaction and linkages between various 
institutions, industrial sectors, technologies, knowledge, incentives, investment, 
and infrastructure determine the higher or relatively stronger or weaker level of 
functioning of a particular NSI. We would argue that the relative strength of an 
NSI can have a mitigating impact on recession. We identified 6 sets of 
components (sub-elements) of NSI that could have significant mitigating impact 
on recession. These are shown in Table 1. These are part of 4 sets of major NSI 
elements that are illustrated in Figure 1. These NSI elements and components of 
these elements are largely derived from the Word Investment Reports published 
by the UNCTAD (e.g. 2002, 2003, 2005) and the NSI literature. 
1 .  G e n e r a l  i n v e s t m e n t  
c l i m a t e  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  
f r a m e w o r k :  
M a c r o e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  
s t a b i l i t y
N a t i o n a l  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  r e g i m e
F o r e i g n  d e b t
In f l a t i o n
In t e r e s t  a n d  E x c h a n g e  r a t e s  
R e g u l a t o r y  r e g i m e  s u c h  a s  
t r a d e  a n d  t a x  p o l i c i e s
N a t u r e  a n d  r o l e  o f  F D I 
N S I
5  S e t s  o f  M a j o r  C o m p o n e n t s  o f  N I S  t h a t  c o u ld  h a v e  M it ig a t in g  I m p a c t  o n  R e c e s s io n  
D e v e l o p e d  N S I s
( U S ,  E U ,  a n d  J a p a n )
L e a r n i n g /  T r a n s i t i o n  N S I s
( B R IC S ,  N IC S s )
N a s c e n t /  W e a k  N S I s
( S u b -S a h a r a n  A fr i c a ,  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a ,  S o u t h  A s i a )
2 .  M a r k e t ,  p e r  c a p i t a  
i n c o m e ,   d o m e s t i c  s a v i n g s :  
D o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  s i z e  /  
s t r u c t u r e
L i n k s  t o  r e g i o n a l  a n d  g l o b a l  
m a r k e t s
D o m e s t i c  s a v i n g s
G r o w t h
3 .  I n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e :  
P r e s e n c e  o f  d i v e r s e  i n d u s t r i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  
S t r e n g t h  o f  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s
P r e s e n c e  a n d  r o l e  o f  fo r e i g n  
f i r m s
L i n k s  t o  fo r e i g n  c o m p a n i e s /  
f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t
 
4 .  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s :
B a n k i n g  s e c t o r
R o l e  a n d  e f fe c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  
C e n t r a l  B a n k
L i n k s  t o  fo r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t
5 .  F o r e i g n  T r a d e :
N a t u r e  o f  e x p o r t s
&  i m p o r t s
E x p o r t  m a r k e t s  ( D e s t i n a t i o n s )
D e p e n d e n c e  o n  c o m m o d i t y  
e x p o r t s
 N S I  T y p e s  a n d  I m p a c t s  
S tr o n g ,  o r  R e la t iv e ly s t r o n g  o r  W e a k  m it ig a t in g  im p a c t  o n  r e c e s s io n .
( D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  a n d  l i n k a g e s  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  N S I 
c o m p o n e n t s )
6 .  S k i l l s ,  R & D ,  &  T e c h n o l o g y  
D e v e l o p m e n t :
In v e s t m e n t  i n  s k i l l s  &  e d u c a t i o n
In v e s t m e n t  i n  R & D
 
 
Figure 2: Strength of National System of Innovation and its Mitigating Impact on 
Recession: A Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 2 presents a conceptual framework linking 6 sets of NSI components or 
sub-elements (which are identified from the 4 major sets of NSI elements as 
shown in Figure 1) to the mitigating impact of NSI on recession. The degree of 
strength of these NSI components and interaction between them will make an 
NSI as either developed, transition/ learning, or nascent/ weaker. The important 
issue we are highlighting here is that although there are many similarities 
between systems of innovation, there are also differences related to the stage of 
development, characteristics of NSI evolution, path dependency, institutions, 
laws, policies, and incentives. These in turn are likely to have either strong, 
relatively strong or weak mitigating impact on recession. That is, if a country 
has a well functioning or strong 6 sets of NSI components identified in Table 1 
and Figure 2, it is likely to witness high mitigating impact on recession. On the 
other hand, if a country has a non-functioning or weak 6 sets of NSI 
components, it is likely to witness no or little mitigating impact on recession. If 
a country has a relatively well functioning 6 sets of NSI components, then it is 
likely to have a relatively strong mitigating impact on recession.  
 
What we mean by mitigating capability is the ability of NSI to deal with and 
respond to unforeseen or foreseen crisis that could be induced internally or 
externally or by the combination of both domestic and internationals factors. 
The tendency is towards restricting or contraction of the economy due to 
changes in business cycle or recessionary down turn in economic activity. 
Therefore the key to see mitigative capability is how NSI components respond 
and deal with this challenge. So, we correlate the NSI components to the 
recessionary downturn to explore whether they can cope or not. This is done by 
using indicative and descriptive data. For example, we take the GDP and see 
whether they have contracted or is it still growing, or reduced severely or 
slightly. We try to show through this the underlying economic strength or 
weakness or relative strength or weakness of the NSI to deal with the 
recessionary crisis. 
 
We are contributing by adding to the existing body of NSI literature by linking 
NSI framework to its potential mitigating impact on recession in national 
economies. The way we did this theoretically is first to identify the four sets of 
elements that constitutes the NSI and then identify 6 sub-elements or 
components of NSI (as shown in Figures 1; and Table 1) and try to 
conceptualize whether and how weak or strong they can have mitigating impact 
on recession. In actual fact we are looking for making a paradigm change of the 
way economic development and recession can be appreciated by employing NSI 
framework (see Figure 2). In this paper we illustrate this empirically by 
analysing the NSI of China using descriptive and secondary data.  
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3. The global recession and China’s NSI 
According to the Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2008, by 
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) China will remain resilient, as strong domestic demand is likely to 
neutralise partly the impact of global recession. The Survey found that not only 
in the case of China but also most other countries in the Asia-Pacific region have 
strong macro-economic fundamentals (efficient fiscal and monetary policies, 
declining budget deficits, and even surpluses) which along with underlying 
regional domestic demand are likely to overcome the global recession triggered 
by the US’ downturn. It is argued that firms in the Asia-Pacific economies 
including China are largely resilient to the credit crunch in the US and EU, as 
they are generally cash rich and not highly leveraged. For example, a report by 
Credit Suisse stated that “in China Internet, telecom and winery sectors are 
particularly top ranked, thanks to their low gearing or net cash positions, with 
their domestic customers facing limited credit tightening issues”(see Website B). 
The ESCAP survey also pointed to the fact that firms in these countries 
including China are more conservative as borrowers and also their central banks 
are also capable of meeting the liquidity demand by the financial sector. Indeed, 
the banks in the US and EU appear to be looking to Asian funds to build their 
depleted capital bases (ESCAP, 2008). For example, many global banks such as 
HSBC, GE Money and Standard Chartered are started looking towards emerging 
markets like China to offset the global losses (BBC, 06 August 2008). 
 
According to a report by Credit Suisse China is likely to be the least affected 
emerging market by the current credit crunch and global recession. Credit Suisse 
studied the impact of liquidity crunch on 216 companies in 59 sectors across 10 
markets in the Asia Pacific region. It said that in Asia, except China, other 
markets are enduring a similar phenomenon as in the US because companies are 
facing difficulties in accessing funds (see Website B). After the US, China is 
now the second most financial power in the world. In terms of market 
capitalisation, it has three of the four largest banks, the two largest insurance 
companies, the second-largest stock market and an increasing number of 
investment funds (Economist, 6 February 2010). 
 
However, like the case of Brazil and South Africa, it is opined that China is 
facing or likely to face some negative impact from the global recession. For 
example, according to Sunil Poshakwale because of the developments in the US, 
stock markets in China have reacted negatively. They suffered mainly due to 
large scale withdrawal made by foreign institutional investors, mainly from the 
US, as they need cash in the US due to credit crunch in the US. But this appears 
to be happening in all emerging markets and not just in China. For example, 
nearly $26bn worth of outflows have occurred between June and August 2008 
from the emerging market economies, compared to about $100bn that happened 
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during the five years between 2002 and 2007. Therefore, the stock markets are 
reacting negatively in these markets (Poshakwale, 2008). 
 
Poshakwale also pointed out some other short term problems faced by China. He 
argued that unlike India, China has been much more proactive and taking risks 
by going out and investing. It had to do this to keep the exchange rate 
(particularly with reference to US$) at a competitive level. China has been 
buying US government bonds, treasury bills and bonds issued by investment 
banks. In fact, three banks in China have bought about $10.5bn worth of bonds 
and some of those bonds were issued by the Lehman Brothers which went 
bankrupt. Because of such direct investments in the US, there is likely to be a 
direct impact on China. In the manufacturing sector particularly in Southern 
China, due to weakening global demand, there have been plant closures and 
layoffs. China’s exports are suffering a bit because of the fall of the US dollar 
(Poshakwale, 2008).  
 
China’s GDP growth has dropped from 11.4% in 2007 to 9.1% in 2008 and has 
declined further to 8.7% in 2009 and also its current-account surplus dropped 
from 11.5% of GDP in 2007 to 8.5% of GDP in 2008. This is due to a number of 
reasons such as declining demand for Chinese exports in mainly in the 
developed economies, the appreciation of its national currency and rising labour 
costs. China’s exports to the US and EU amount to about 8% and 7% of GDP 
respectively, and therefore recession in these economies are likely to have 
significant impact on China (UN, 2009, p.116; Akyuz, 2008, p.38). But 
declining exports have actually led to increase in China’s trade surplus in 2008. 
This is due to sharp decline in imports of inputs that go into export products. 
This is also due to reduced domestic demand. But in 2009, imports are expected 
to increase with the implementation of planned increase in infrastructure 
investment, which will stimulate demand for raw materials and machinery 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2008). According to preliminary ESCAP 
forecasts of the impact of the recession, particularly the sharp economic 
slowdown in the US, on China’s growth in 2009 indicate that its exports will 
decline from 13.4% to 4.5% (ESCAP, 2008a, p.2).  
 
To face the potential adverse impacts of the global recession, in November 
2008, China announced a fiscal stimulus package of $586b (14% of GDP) to be 
implemented during 2009-10. Using this over two years it aims to stimulate 
domestic demand by reducing taxes, investing in public infrastructure, and 
promoting activities in the areas such as health care and education, agriculture, 
low-income housing, water, electricity, transportation, environment, 
technological innovation and rebuilding areas. The stimulus package is also 
designed to boost the income of the poor through measures including higher 
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subsidies and an increased government purchase price for grains in 2009 (UN, 
2009, p.116; Economic Commission for Africa, 2008).  
 
The fiscal stimulus package will increase infrastructure investment mainly in 
railways, airports, environmental infrastructure, low-cost housing and the re-
construction of areas affected by the earthquake in Sichuan in 2008. The 
expenditure on education and healthcare will be increased substantially in 2009-
10. While the US government spending is directed at consumption, the main 
focus of China’s stimulus is towards investment on infrastructure and new 
technologies that will help future growth. The government is using the global 
recession as an opportunity to build sophisticated infrastructure for the second 
tier cities. It is planning to invest $200 billion on railways in two years, building 
44,000 miles of new roads and 100 new airports in the next decade. China is 
also investing in alternative energy sector and it now spends more on solar, 
wind, and battery technology than the US. Among the top 10 companies (by 
market capitalization) in this sector, four are Chinese and three are American. It 
is also investing heavily in higher education (Zakaria, 2009). 
 
The government also reduced or suspended a number of taxes to help the 
businesses. The People’s Bank of China 9the central bank) has relaxed the 
monetary policy by removing loan quotas, and reducing interest rates and 
reserve ratio. China has also used the global financial crisis to internationalize 
the use of RMB in global trading. For this, it instituted a series of currency swap 
agreements worth RMB650b (US$95b) with countries including Malaysia, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Argentina and Belarus (The Economic 
Intelligence Unit, 2009).  
 
Despite this, growth dropped to 8.7% in 2009, mainly due to very weak global 
demand and significant drop in exports and slowdown experienced by the real 
estate sector that affected the steel and cement sectors. However, slowdown in 
growth is expected to be a short term problem rather than a long-term trend. 
Because, even within domestic market China has significant potential for growth 
as demands remain strong. For example, retail sales in China have been growing 
by 20% a year (BBC, 06 August 2008). It is further argued that by itself the 
current credit crunch may not seriously affect the economic growth in China and 
it may reduce the growth rate by a couple of percentage points. However, 
serious external problems such as sudden stop of capital flows and contraction 
of export markets are expected to have severe impact on China’s growth rate. 
Despite significant drop in exports, the trade surplus remained huge in 2009. 
 
Table 2 shows key economic indications for China. It is clear that GDP growth 
in China has dropped from 13% in 2007 to over 9% in 2008. The gross domestic 
savings have grown significantly until 2007 and dropped slightly in 2008, but it 
is still significant (i.e. about 50% of GDP). Inflation has increased by 1% in 
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2008, but budget balance and current account balance are significant. But the 
export growth has dropped significantly in 2008, but imports remained strong 
(dropped only slightly) in 2008. The RMB has appreciated significantly against 
the US$ during 2007-2008. The global recession appears to have significant 
negative impact during 2008-2009. This is clear from the declining figures in 
number of areas including Industrial value-added output growth, Retail sales 
growth, Urban per capita disposable income growth, and Rural per capita net 
income growth. However, the Fixed-asset investment growth has increased 
significantly in 2008-2009. Investment remained strong due to relaxed credit 
policy that helped to increase lending by the banks. China also issued ‘local 
government bonds’ to raise planned US$200billion to finance the infrastructure 
projects. 
 
Table 2: China: Key Economic Indicators (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.0 8.7 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
38.0 39.0 40.4 43.0 45.6 47.3 47.8 48.6 49.9 -- 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Rates (% of GDP) 
35.1 36.3 37.9 41.2 43.3 43.3 44.5 44.2 41.8 -- 
Fixed-Asset Investment 
Growth (%) 
10.3 13.0 16.9 27.7 26.8 26.0 23.9 24.8 25.9 30.1 
Inflation Rates (%) 0.4 0.5 -0.8 1.2 3.9 1.8 1.5 4.8 5.9 -0.7 
Budget Balance (% of GDP) -2.8 -2.5 -2.6 -2.2 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 0.7 0.4  
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
1.7 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.5 7.0 9.1 11.5 10.2 6.9e
Merchandise Export Growth 
Rates (%) 
27.9 6.7 22.4 34.6 35.4 28.4 27.2 25.7 17.3 -- 
Merchandise Import Growth 
Rates (%) 
24.4 12.6 27.1 39.9 36.0 17.6 19.9 20.7 18.4 -- 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 
($ billion) 
165.6 212.2 286.4 403.3 609.9 818.8 1066.
3 
1528.
2 
1946.0 2399.
2 
Foreign Exchange Rate (= 
1US$) 
8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.07 7.81 7.30 6.83 6.83 
Foreign Debt ($ billion) 145.7 170.1 171.4 193.6 228.6 281.0 323.6 373.6 374.7 -- 
Industrial Value Added 
Output (% Growth)** 
17.8 11.6 16.5 27.3 30.5 31.7 26.2 28.5 12.9 11.0 
Retail Sales Growth (%) 9.7 10.1 11.8 9.1 13.3 12.9 13.7 16.8 21.6 15.5 
Urban Per Capita Disposable 
Income Growth (%) 
7.3 9.2 12.3 10.0 11.2 11.4 12.1 17.2 14.5 8.8 
Rural Per Capita Net Income 
Growth (%) 
1.9 5.0 4.6 5.9 12.0 10.8 10.2 15.4 15.0 8.2 
Registered Urban 
Unemployment Rate 
3.1 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 -- 
Expenditure on R&D as % of 
GDP 
0.90 0.95 1.07 1.13 1.23 1.33 1.42 1.5 -- -- 
Public Expenditure on 
Education as % of GDP 
1.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- 4.9+ -- -- 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, New York: United Nations. * Either 
estimated figure or for only part of the year; IMF (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and 
Measuring Systematic Risk, April, Washington D.C: IMF, Table 11, p. 190; UNESCO - Statistics on Research and Development, and 
Education. Available at: http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (Accessed: 23 March 2010); + Ministry of 
Education, China (2008); US-China Business Council (no date), China’s Economic Statistics, Available at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/ 
economy.html. **All state-owned industrial enterprises and all non-state industrial enterprises with revenue from principal business of more 
than RMB 5 million. -- means Not Available. 
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Table 2 also shows that China has been investing in R&D between 1% and 1.5% 
of GDP since 2002. Its total R&D expenditure in 2007 was 371.02 billion RMB 
(1.5% of GDP) which increased to 461.6 billion RMB (1.54% of GDP) in 2008. 
Between 2001 and 2006, while corporate R&D in the US and Europe grew by 1-
2%, in China it jumped to 23%. China's corporate R&D spending (percentage of 
GDP) is almost same as that of the European Union (around 1%). China is likely 
to overtake Japan soon in total research spending (Economist, 3 January 2009). 
From UNESCO - Statistics it is also clear that the growth in number of 
researchers have been significant in China and it has been growing faster than 
other countries such as India and Brazil. In China, the education expenditure in 
2007 was 1214.80 billion RMB (4.9% of GDP) which increased to 
1450.07 billion RMB (4.82% of GDP) in 2008 (Ministry of Science and 
Technology, 2008; Ministry of Education, 2008).  
 
Table 3 shows the trend in the composition of GDP by sectors in China since 
1991. It clearly shows that the primary sector’s (Agriculture) contribution to 
GDP has declined from over 14% in 2001 to 11% in 2008 and the contribution 
of the industry (excluding the Construction sector) has increased during the 
same period from 40% to 43%, and the contribution of tertiary sector (Services) 
remains at about 40%. That is, about 90% China’s GDP is composed of 
manufacturing and services. However, the composition of the labour force by 
occupation in 2008 was estimated as: agriculture - 39.5%; industry - 27.2%; and 
services - 33.2%. This shows the predominant dependence on Agriculture sector 
for employment. 
 
 
Table 3: China - GDP Composition (1991 – 2008) 
  
Year 
GDP %   Primary 
industry % 
Secondary 
industry % 
Secondary industry 
 
 Tertiary 
Industry 
% 
Industry %  Construction %  
1991 100.0 24.5 41.8 37.1 4.7 33.7 
1992 100.0 21.8 43.4 38.2 5.3 34.8 
1993 100.0 19.7 46.6 40.2 6.4 33.7 
1994 100.0 19.8 46.6 40.4 6.2 33.6 
1995 100.0 19.9 47.2 41.0 6.1 32.9 
         
1996 100.0 19.7 47.5 41.4 6.2 32.8 
1997 100.0 18.3 47.5 41.7 5.9 34.2 
1998 100.0 17.6 46.2 40.3 5.9 36.2 
1999 100.0 16.5 45.8 40.0 5.8 37.7 
2000 100.0 15.1 45.9 40.4 5.6 39.0 
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2001 100.0 14.4 45.1 39.7 5.4 40.5 
2002 100.0 13.7 44.8 39.4 5.4 41.5 
2003 100.0 12.8 46.0 40.5 5.5 41.2 
2004 100.0 13.4 46.2 40.8 5.4 40.4 
2005 100.0 12.2 47.7 42.2 5.5 40.1 
         
2006 100.0 11.3 48.7 43.1 5.6 40.0 
2007 100.0 11.3 48.6 43.0 5.6 40.1 
2008 100 11.3 48.6 42.9 5.7 40.1 
Source: Website of National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ 
 
 
 
Table 4: China: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – Quarterly Trends in 2008 and 2009 
Quarterly Period  Gross 
Domestic 
Products 
 
Primary 
Industry 
Secondary 
Industry 
Tertiary 
Industry 
2008 - Quarter 1 
Absolute Value  
(in 100 million Yuan)  
66284 4679 32158 29447 
Growth Rate over same 
period last year (%)  
11.3 2.7 12.0 11.6 
2008 - Quarter 2 
Absolute Value 140478 11697 70543 58238 
Growth Rate - % Change 11.0 3.4 11.9 11.4 
2008 - Quarter 3 
Absolute Value 217026 21869 105889 89268 
Growth Rate - % Change 10.6 4.4 11.2 11.2 
2008 - Quarter 4 
Absolute Value 314045 33702 149003 131340 
Growth Rate - % Change 9.6 5.4 9.9 10.4 
2009 - Quarter 1 
Absolute Value 68682 4660 32515 31507 
Growth Rate - % Change 6.2 3.5 5.4 7.4 
2009 - Quarter 2 
Absolute Value 145985 11915 71391 62680 
Growth Rate - % Change 7.1 3.8 6.7 8.3 
2009 - Quarter 3 
Absolute Value 227597 22300 108629 96668 
Growth Rate - % Change 7.8 4.0 7.7 8.9 
2009 - Quarter 4 
Absolute Value 335353 35477 156958 142918 
Growth Rate - % Change 8.7 4.2 9.5 8.9 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (Available at: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/Quarterlydata/) 
Notes by NBSC:  
1. Absolute value is computed at current price, growth rate is computed at constant price. 
2. Statistical data in this table adjusted according to the results of the Second National Economic Census (2008). 
3. Statistical data in this table are preliminary verification results (2009). 
 
Table 4 shows the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – Quarterly Trends in 2008 
and 2009 in China. It shows that the GDP growth fell to 9.6% in Quarter 4 of 
2008 compared to 11.3% in Quarter 1 of that year. This is mainly because of the 
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significant decline of growth in the secondary industry and a relatively small 
decline in tertiary industry. The GDP growth registered a sharp decline in 
Quarter 1 of 2009, that is, 6.2% compared to 9.6% in the Quarter 4 in 2008 due 
to sharp decline of growth in all three sectors. But by Quarter 4 it recovered to 
8.7% mainly because of significant recovery in all three sectors.  
 
Table 5 provides China’s trade volume, both imports and exports. It is very clear 
China has achieved a large trade balance particularly since 2005. While exports 
have seen big increase, the imports also have increased which suggests that 
increasing exports caused increased demands for imported goods. Global 
recession appears to have affected significantly both the exports and imports of 
goods and services. The real growth of exports was about 10% in 2008 
compared to over 16% in 2007 and it was estimated to be -8.8% in 2009. 
Similarly the real growth of imports in 2008 was 4.1 compared to over 13% in 
2007 and it was estimated to be -8.0% in 2009 (The Economic Intelligence Unit, 
2009). Although export volume declined significantly as external demand 
dropped, the negative impact on the growth was small or marginal, as imports 
also witnessed a large drop mainly because of the decline in import demand by 
the exporting companies. Because of this, trade surplus actually increased 
significantly during recession period.  
 
 
Table 5: China -- Total volume of import and export (1991 – 2008) (Since 1980 are 
numbers of customs import and export statistics) 
Year  RMB (100 million) USD (100 million) 
Total 
volume of 
Export & 
Import 
Total 
volume of 
Export 
Total 
volume of 
Import 
Balance Total 
volume of 
Export & 
Import 
Total 
volume of 
Export 
Total 
volume 
of 
Import 
Balance 
         
1991 7225.8 3827.1 3398.7 428.4 1357.0 719.1 637.9 81.2 
1992 9119.6 4676.3 4443.3 233.0 1655.3 849.4 805.9 43.5 
1993 11271.0 5284.8 5986.2 -701.4 1957.0 917.4 1039.6 -122.2 
1994 20381.9 10421.8 9960.1 461.7 2366.2 1210.1 1156.1 54.0 
1995 23499.9 12451.8 11048.1 1403.7 2808.6 1487.8 1320.8 167.0 
                  
1996 24133.8 12576.4 11557.4 1019.0 2898.8 1510.5 1388.3 122.2 
1997 26967.2 15160.7 11806.5 3354.2 3251.6 1827.9 1423.7 404.2 
1998 26849.7 15223.6 11626.1 3597.5 3239.5 1837.1 1402.4 434.7 
1999 29896.2 16159.8 13736.4 2423.4 3606.3 1949.3 1657.0 292.3 
2000 39273.2 20634.4 18638.8 1995.6 4742.9 2492.0 2250.9 241.1 
                  
2001 42183.6 22024.4 20159.2 1865.2 5096.5 2661.0 2435.5 225.5 
2002 51378.2 26947.9 24430.3 2517.6 6207.7 3256.0 2951.7 304.3 
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2003 70483.5 36287.9 34195.6 2092.3 8509.9 4382.3 4127.6 254.7 
2004 95539.1 49103.3 46435.8 2667.5 11545.5 5933.2 5612.3 320.9 
2005 116921.8 62648.1 54273.7 8374.4 14219.1 7619.5 6599.5 1020.0 
                  
2006 140971.4 77594.6 63376.9 14217.7 17604.0 9689.4 7914.6 1774.8 
2007 166740.2 93455.6 73284.6 20171.1 21737.3 12177.8 9559.5 2618.3 
2008 179921.5 100394.9 79526.5 20868.4 25632.6 14306.9 11325.6 2981.3 
Source: China Statistics Year Book 2009, National Bureau of Statistics of China at 
http://www.sei.gov.cn/try/hgjj/yearbook/2009/indexce.htm 
 
 
Table 6: Total volume of import and export between China and other countries and 
regions 
10,000USD  
Nation/region 
2007 2008 
Total 
volume of 
Export & 
Import 
Total 
volume of 
Export 
Total 
volume 
of Import 
Total 
volume of 
Export & 
Import 
Total 
volume of 
Export 
Total volume 
of Import 
Total 217372602 121777576 95595026 256325523 143069307 113256216 
Asia 118780058 56787403 61992655 136670464 66411850 70258614 
Africa 7365693 3729773 3635920 10720686 5123992 5596694
Europe 42752139 28784856 13967283 51148109 34342205 16805904
Latin America 10265030 5153940 5111090 14340599 7176204 7164395
North America 33252284 25211509 8040776 36834226 27427243 9406982
Pacific 4951455 2110096 2841359 6611439 2587812 4023627
Others 5942 5942 5849  5849
Source: China Statistics Year Book 2009, National Bureau of Statistics of China at 
http://www.sei.gov.cn/try/hgjj/yearbook/2009/indexce.htm 
 
Table 6 shows that trend in China’s exports and imports to different regions of 
the world. It is very clear that Asian region is the top destination for China’s 
exports, followed by Europe and North America. This is same in the case of its 
imports, that is, predominantly imports come from Asian region, followed by 
European region and North America. Major export commodities included: 
electrical and other machinery, including data processing equipment, apparel, 
textiles, iron and steel, optical and medical equipment; and major imports 
included electrical and other machinery, oil and mineral fuels, optical and 
medical equipment, metal ores, plastics, organic chemicals. The major export 
partners in 2008 included: US 17.7%, Hong Kong 13.3%, Japan 8.1%, South 
Korea 5.2%, Germany 4.1%. The major import partners in 2008 included: Japan 
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13.3%, South Korea 9.9%, Taiwan 9.2%, US 7.2%, Germany 4.9% (CIA, 2009). 
While the US and the Europe are major markets apart from Asian countries for 
exports from China, the Asian economies are the main source for imports to 
China. 
 
 
Table 7: Inward Foreign Direct investment: China and India 
Country FDI Inward Stock FDI Net Inflows 
US$ in 
millions 
% of GDP US$ in 
millions
% of GDP 
2007 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2007 2007 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2007
China 327,087 9.7 16.0 13.5 9.6 83,521 3.6 4.1 3.3 2.5 
India 76,226 0.9 3.0 5.2 6.7 22,950 0.2 0.7 0.9 2.0 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 10 p. 183, New York: United 
Nations 
 
Table 7 shows that the FDI inflow remained very significant over the years 
(2.5% of GDP in 2007) and it was nearly four times that of India. 
 
 
Table 8: Major Macroeconomic Indicators (2008-2009) - Comparison of China to Other 
Emerging Economies 
Indicators Brazil India China South Africa 
GDP Real Growth Rate (%) 
2007 5.7 9.0 13.0 4.9 
2008 5.9 7.1 9.0 3.1 
2009* 0.1 6.5 8.7 -1.9 
Industrial Production Growth (%) 
2009* -7 7.6 8.1 -7 
Debt – External (US$-billion) 
2008 262.9 232.5 400.6* 71.8 
2009 216.1* 223.9* 347.1* 73.8 
Public Debt (% of GDP) 
2008 38.8* 57.6* 15.6* 31.6* 
2009 46.8* 59.6* 18.2* 35.7* 
Inflation Rate (%)     
2008 5.9 8.3* 5.9* 11.3* 
2009 4.2* 10.7* -0.8* 7.2* 
Reserve of Foreign Exchange & Gold (US$) 
2008 193.8 billion* 254.0b 1.96 trillion* 34.1b* 
2009 238.0 billion* 287.5b 2.21 trillion* 37.4b* 
Stock of Direct Foreign Investment - At Home (US$- billion) 
2008 294.0 123.4* 758.9* 120.0* 
2009 318.5 161.3* 576.1* 125.7* 
Stock of Direct Foreign Investment - Abroad (US$- billion) 
2008 127.5* 61.8* 184.0* 63.6* 
2009 124.3* 77.4* 227.3* 65.1* 
Exports (US$)     
2008 197.9 billion* 200.9b 1.43 trillion* 82.12b* 
2009 158.9 billion* 165.0b* 1.19 trillion* 67.93* 
Imports (US$)     
2008 173.1 billion* 322.3b* 1.13 trillion* 90.57b* 
2009 136.0 billion* 253.9b* 921.5b* 70.24b* 
Source: CIA – The World Fact Book (2009) 
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Table 8 shows that among the 4 emerging economies, China is in far better 
position among the emerging countries in terms of number of macroeconomic 
indicators including GDP real growth rate, exports and imports, FDI, Foreign 
exchange reserve, inflation, industrial production growth, current account 
balance (% GDP), external debt refinancing needs. South Africa is in 
unfavourable position in terms of number of indicators, but its FDI stocks at 
home and abroad are comparable to those of India. In terms of public debt (% 
GDP) South Africa is in a better position than India and Brazil. 
 
These specific advantages appear to have helped China to recover faster from 
the global recession. A number of indicators in 2009 pointed to this. For 
example, car sales increased by 53%, industrial profits increased by 70% in the 
three months to November compared with a year earlier, exports up by 18%, 
year on year, and imports jumped 56% due to strong domestic demand 
(Economist, 16 January 2010).  
 
When China unveiled its stimulus package, some expressed concerns that the 
economy may suffer long slump due to excessive lending, overinvestment and 
overvalued share and house prices, as it happened in Japan during the 1980s. 
Others also argued that because of the financial crisis in the US and the collapse 
of American spending power, China's export-led economy would be seriously 
affected. These did not materialise as some feared. First, China did not follow 
the experience of Japan due to major differences between the two. For example, 
while Japan's property boom was driven by credit, in China one quarter of home 
buyers pay cash, and generally mortgage covers only 50% of a property's value. 
Similarly, the share prices in China are not as high as they were in Japan in 
1980s. Second, China was able to successfully avoid serious impact caused by 
drop in demand for its exports in the US by diversifying to other emerging 
markets. In 2009, Chinese exports to India, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia have 
grown by between 30% and 50% (Sunday Times, 14 February 2010). “When 
China's government announced its stimulus package in November 2008, the 
pessimists claimed that it contained little new money. In fact, it turned out to be 
perhaps the biggest and most successful intentional monetary and fiscal stimulus 
in history” (Economist, 16 January 2010). 
 
 
4. Analysis  
In this section we compare the data from previous section related to China and 
global recession with the 6 sets of NSI components/ sub-elements identified in 
the conceptual framework (see Table 9). By this we try to show how analysing 
all 6 sets of NSI related data could identify the potential mitigating capability of 
an individual NSI and help to draw some general conclusions. 
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One of the reasons for China not being affected seriously by the financial crisis 
in the US and EU is the nature of banking and financial system in China. The 
government control over the financial system has been much stronger. For 
example, the reserve requirements of banks were constantly raised from 7% in 
2003 to 15% in 2008 and banks are holding over 80% of central bank securities 
issued for that purpose (Ayaz, 2008, p.21). China was able to provide fiscal 
support because of its reserve stockpiles, more credible inflation-targeting 
regimes, and stronger public balance sheets. 
 
Although the emerging economies in general have been affected by the global 
recession and saw their growth reduced by the end of 2008, China did not see 
such decline mainly because of lower shares of their export sectors in domestic 
production and more resilient domestic demand. China’s policy measures have 
supported domestic activity and the first quarter of 2009 has shown some signs 
of a turnaround in economic activity (IMF, 2009, pp.4-5, p.71). This is also 
reflected in the Shanghai stock market which was “one of the world’s best 
performing markets in 2009” (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2009, p.16). Also, 
the Bank of China and China Merchants Bank and smaller institutions have been 
able to raise money either through initial public offerings or direct placements to 
state-owned industrial companies. Between September 2009 and February 2010, 
they were able to rise over 200 billion-250 billion, which appears to have helped 
China a faster recovery from the global crisis (Economist, 27 February 2010).  
 
Another factor that helps China to minimize the impact of global recession is the 
nature outward investment by residents. Unlike Indian firms which acquired 
assets abroad funded by capital inflows, China’s companies acquired assets 
abroad by foreign exchange earnings from trade surpluses. That is, their 
acquisition of assets abroad has been based on their success of competition in 
international markets (Ayaz, 2008, pp.27-28). 
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Table 9: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on 
Recession – China 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of China 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
(a) More stronger than other emerging countries. Although GDP growth 
declined from 11.4 % in 2007 to 9% in 2008, and to 8.7% in 2009 it is still 
high despite the global recession  
(b) Current account balance is significant (about 11% of GDP); US$b 
319.8 in 2009 (6.9% of GDP) and US$b271.7 in 2010 (5.2% of GDP) 
forecasted by Economic Intelligence Unit (2009). 
(c) External financing (total bonds, equities, and loans) amounted to 
US$30b in 2008. 
(d) Inflation increased from 4.8% in 2007 to 5.9 in 2008; and it 
experienced deflation, i.e. -0.7% in 2009 because of global recession. 
(e) Reduced interest rate / RMB appreciated significantly despite global 
crisis. 
(f) Strong government control and regulatory regime; responded to present 
crisis with big stimulation package (US$586b) 
(g) FDI inflow declined significantly.  
2. Market, per capita income, domestic 
savings:  
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
 
(a) Large domestic market than other cases and strong domestic demand 
(b) Strong links to Asian markets as well as global markets such as EU and 
the US 
(c) High gross domestic savings rate of growth (50% of GDP). Significant 
growth in urban per capita disposable income and rural per capita net 
income until 2008 (they declined significantly in 2009)  
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) Significantly diversified sectors with manufacturing sector leading. But 
this sector seems to have been the most affected sector due to current 
global crisis. 
(b) Strong domestic firms. They are more conservative borrowers. Stock 
prices fell in response to global crisis.  
(c) Strong presence of foreign firms. Foreign investors withdrew funds due 
to global crisis. 
(d) Strong links to foreign financial market, but Chinese firms are not 
facing serious risks due to this. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central 
Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
 
(a) Strong government control over banking and financial sector with 
stringent reserve requirements. EU and the US banking sectors are looking 
towards Chinese financial sector to gain recovery from current crisis. 
(b) Strong central bank with strong capability to meet liquidity demands of 
the financial sector 
(c) Strong links to foreign financial market, but China has taken risks in 
investing in foreign financial markets. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
 
(a) Exports (particularly manufacturing) declined due to current recession. 
This led to decline in imports and resulted in trade surplus. 
(b) Main export markets are Asia, EU (7% of GDP), US (8% of GDP); 
main markets for imports are in Asia, followed by the US and Germany. 
(c) Less significant dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills 
(human resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been significant. Public 
investment on education has reached about 5% of GDP in 2008. 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 0.86 in 2000 to 0.92% of GDP 
in 2006 (about 70% by Business enterprises and about 25% by the 
government). This increased to 1.5% of GDP in 2008. 
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Furthermore, China’s capital-spending through the stimulus package did not 
result in industrial overcapacity as believed by some, as it was driven mainly by 
infrastructure investment and also because investment in manufacturing declined 
sharply during this period. It is also believed that “by and large, investment in 
roads, railways and the electricity grid will help China sustain its growth in the 
years ahead” (Economist, 16 January 2010). The recession helped to bring down 
food and commodity prices which helped China’s economic recovery. The 
recession also helped to correct some of the imbalances in the industry and 
economy. For example, manufacturers of cheap goods and inefficient businesses 
went out of business because of the sudden collapse of the export market, which 
forced Chinese manufacturers to move up the technological ladder. Also, the 
drop in exports has encouraged manufacturers to move their operations from 
coastal regions to inland to cut costs and meet domestic demand which appears 
to be helping to correct some historic regional imbalances (Yao, 2009). It 
appears that the perception of China’s dependence on the US export market 
would have serious impact on its economy is rather misplaced, although it had 
some negative impacts.  
 
Although the Chinese national currency renminbi (RMB) that is pegged to the 
dollar have also appreciated in real effective terms, it has remained broadly 
unchanged relative to the dollar. While other leading exporters such as Japan 
have experienced sharp decline in demand for manufacturing exports, China is 
expected to witness significant economic growth (though less than recent years,) 
with increasing domestic demand (IMF, 2009, p.16 and 71). Although growth in 
2009 was 8.7% (compared to 13% growth rate recorded pre-crisis in 2007), it is 
still considered a strong performance in the current global recession conditions 
when many Asian economies experienced severe contractions. IMF has 
identified two factors for this. First, although the exports declined significantly, 
its impact is not severe as they have a smaller share of the economy, particularly 
after factoring in its high import content. Second, the government has acted 
aggressively with policy measures to stimulate it domestic market with the aim 
of helping to boost consumption (IMF, 2009, p.72). Retail sales have increased 
due to relatively good job figures (e.g. 1.6m jobs were created in the first three 
months of 2009) and rising wages. “Preliminary indicators suggest that the 
government’s efforts to support economic growth have had faster impact that 
was expected” (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2009, p.5). 
 
In 2009, with the beginning of economic recovery China has emerged as the 
world’s largest exporter, surpassing Germany, it also became the world’s largest 
market for vehicles, surpassing the US, and Chinese stock market overtook 
Japan as the world’s second-biggest, measured by the market capitalisation of its 
companies. It is holding the world’s largest foreign reserves, over $2.1 trillion. 
The global recession and strong national economy has provided an opportunity 
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for China a leading role in formulating the international economic policy to 
address the economic crisis. As a result, G20 Group which met in London to 
consider international response to the global finance crisis agreed that the quota 
system of the IMF and World Bank would be adjusted to raise China’s 
contribution and its voting rights. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated: “China’s role in the 
international policy debate has been rising in tandem with its growing economy. 
As a key member of the G20, China is helping to design the global priorities for 
the future and devise solutions to global problems”. 
 
The huge US$ reserve in China also helped it to contribute to global liquidity 
through loan deals with a number of countries such as member countries of 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Taiwan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Brazil, and Venezuela. China also increased the investment through 
China-Africa Development Fund. The global recession also helped China to 
forge trade deals in its national currency RMB. China’s recovery has also helped 
commodity-producing nations, which are generally big losers during recessions 
because of collapsing commodity prices. As China is the world’s biggest 
consumer of many raw materials, after the US, demands from China helped 
maintain commodity prices. This particularly helped countries in the Middle 
East, Latin America, Australia and Canada. This in turn helped China in signing 
long-term trade deals in RMB rather than US$, with the effect of slowly turning 
the RMB into an alternative to the US$ (King, 2009). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
On the NSI side we took six variables such as macroeconomic stability, market 
structure, per capita income and domestic savings, industrial structure, financial 
institutions, foreign trade and skills, R&D and technology development as 
relevant indicators of how changes in these indicators is correlated to the impact 
of the recession as much as these can be read through the available data. 
 
On the mitigating capability side we correlated whether the actions taken are 
defensive by taking measures like imposing protection, reduction in bank 
lending, consumer fear to spend and save and even hoard, reducing expenditure 
on R&D, reducing imports and finding new markets for reduced exports as a 
result of the recessionary downturn and changes in public policy. 
 
What emerges from the case of China is that the recessionary impact has forced 
the regulatory tightening by Government and made it to introduce a massive 
stimulus package to invigorate the economy. Whilst the recession has made 
some negative impact on the economy, the basic elements of the NSI appear to 
function to bring about and overcome the recessionary downturn by taking 
macroeconomic stability without imposing stringent policies of control, 
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restricting markets, domestic demand and per capita income, and continuing to 
fund education, skills development and R & D. 
 
It appears that China has not been severely affected by the global recession 
mainly due to the inherent strength of its NSI. Also, it appears that China has 
decided to use the global recession as an opportunity rather than an obstacle and 
as ‘blessing in disguise’ to introduce changes and re-engineer its economy and 
NSI. For example, China used the global financial crisis to introduce and 
strengthen strong regulatory and competitive measures against all but the state-
controlled local financial institutions. According to Charles Kaye, CEO of the 
global private-equity firm Warburg Pincus: “All other governments have 
responded to this crisis defensively, protecting their weak spots. China has used 
it to move aggressively forward.” (Zakaraia, 2009). The NSI in China appears to 
have helped the country to emerge as a more stable and strong economy in the 
world. This is reflected by the comment made by Chinese official to the 
Financial Times: “We used to see the US as our teacher but now we realise that 
our teacher keeps making mistakes and we've decided to quit the class” (Stelzer, 
2010, p.4). 
 
Overall the assumption we had that economies in transition are evolving strong 
NSI (the six identified NSI characteristics) that can cope with recessionary 
downturn appears to be borne out by the available data for the case of China. 
They showed that despite some negative impacts and problems, China’s 
economy has emerged stronger from the recession largely due to strong NSI. 
They also showed that global recession has led to changes in the NSI 
characteristics such as mobility of firms from coastal regions to inland regions, 
reengineering domestic demand and market, and changes to its financial market 
and so on.  
 
This paper illustrates the importance of framing the challenge of the recession 
by using the NSI of a country. That is, instead of focusing on individual 
institutions, we have taken the NSI as a whole in relation to estimating the 
capability of the country to work its way out of the global recession. Very often 
when we look at the discussions of recession, the NSI is not used. What we have 
done here is to bring the NSI to the forefront to look at both political and 
economic system and its ability to respond to the recessionary tide.  
 
The second major contribution is the policy learning that is needed when global 
recession confronts specific NSI. What we can say now from the policy side is 
that there is a need for integrated policy response (taking into account all the 6 
sets of NSI components that we have identified in our conceptual framework) 
not an ad-hoc or compartmentalised approach (e.g. tinkering trade or banking 
regulations, or fiscal policy) to overcoming the crisis. Such integrated policy 
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approach that takes all the relevant NSI components into account will be far 
more robust in responding to and managing the impact of any global 
recessionary crisis. 
 
References 
Akyuz, Y. (2008), The Current Global Financial Turmoil & Asian Developing Countries, 
Bangkok: ESCAP (UN). 
African Development Bank, AVC, and UNECA (2008), The Global Financial Crisis: Impact 
on African Economies and Policy Responses, Tunis, Tunisia: AfDB. 
BBC (2008), ‘Credit crunch: Around the world,’ 06 August, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/7537173.stm 
Burnick, M. (2008), “Amid Global Credit Crunch, It’s “Business as Usual” in Brazil”, The 
Sovereign Society, Monday, February 18, Vol. 10, No. 41. Available at: 
http://www.greenlandsecurities.com/espanol/PDFs/news/BusinessAsUsualInBrazilfeb18.p
df 
Cimoli, M. (2000), Developing Innovation Systems: Mexico in a Global Context, London: 
Continuum). 
Donohoe, M. (2008), “What the credit crunch means for South Africa,” TradeInvestSA, 22 
October (http://www.tradeinvestsa.co.za/feature_articles/843629.htm) 
Edquist, C. (Ed) (1997) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organisations, 
London: Pinter. 
Economic Commission for Africa (2008), Development in the World Economy and 
Implications for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UN ECA. 
Economic Commission for Africa (2009), Economic Report on Africa – 2009: Developing 
Agriculture through Regional Value Chains, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UN ECA. 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2008), “Asia–Pacific Faces 
“Heightened Uncertainty” Over Credit Crunch, US slowdown”, Economic and Social 
Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2008: Sustaining growth and sharing prosperity, ESCAP, 
UN. Available at: http://www.unescap.org/survey2008/backgrounders/07_regional_socio-
economic_developments.asp 
Economist (2010), “ Bears in a China shop”, 16 January, Vol. 394, Issue 8665. 
Economist (2010), “Not just another fake”, 16 January, Vol. 394, Issue 8665. 
Economist (2010), “Red Mist: China’s Financial System”, 6 February 2010, Vol. 394, Issue 
8668. 
Economist (2010), “Hole sale”, 27 February 2010, Vol. 394, Issue 8671. 
Economist (2010), “Rising in the East”, 3 January 2009, Vol. 390, Issue 8612. 
ESCAP (UN), (2008a), “Financial Crisis”, Macro Economic Policy Brief, vol.1, no.2. De-
cember 2008, Available at: http://www.unescap.org/pdd/publications/me_brief/mepb_2.pdf 
Freeman, C. (1982) ‘Technological infrastructure and international competitiveness’, Draft 
paper submitted to the OECD Ad hoc-group on Science, Technology and Competitiveness, 
August, mimeo. 
Freeman, C. (1987) Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, 
London: Pinter. 
Freeman, C. (1995) ‘The National Innovation Systems in historical perspective’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5-24. 
Gu, S. and Lundvall, B. A. (2006) ‘China's Innovation System and the Move Toward 
Harmonious Growth and Endogenous Innovation’, Innovation: Management, Policy & 
Practice, Vol. 8, No. 1-2, pp. 1-26. 
 25
IMF (2008) Regional economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2008/afr/eng/sreo1008.pdf. 
IMF (2009), World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery, April, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2009a), World Economic Outlook Update, 28 June, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2009b), “China's Leadership Key in Global Economic Recovery and Reform, IMF 
Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn Says,” Press Release No. 09/408, November 
16. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09408.htm. 
Intarakumnerd, P. and Chaminade, C. (2007) ‘Strategy versus Practice in Innovation System 
Policy: the Case of Thailand,’ Asian Journal of Technology Innovation, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 
197-213. 
King, S (2009), “China could emerge ahead of the field in this latest stress test,” The 
Independent, May 11. 
List, F. (1856) National System of Political Economy, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 
Li, J. Y. (2005) Investing in China: The Emerging Venture Capital Industry, London: GMB 
Publishing. 
Lundvall, B. A. (1988) ‘Innovations as in Interactive Process: From User-Producer Interaction 
to the National System of Innovation’, in G. Dosi (Ed.), Technical Change and Economic 
Theory, London, Printer.  
Lundvall, B. A. (Ed) (1992) National Systems of Innovation: towards a theory of innovation 
and interactive learning, London: Pinter. 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (2007). ‘National Innovation Systems-Analytical Concept and Development 
Tool’. Industry and Innovation, vol. 14, no. 1. pp. 95-119. 
Mani, S. (2006) ‘A Review of the Issues with Respect to India’s National Innovation System,’ 
BRICS International Workshop, Aalborg University, Denmark (February). Available at: 
http://globelics.org/downloads/BRICS+workshop06/India%20Sunil%20Mani%20.pdf  
Mashelkar, R. (2001) ‘The Indian Innovation System,” Development Outreach, World Bank 
Institute, Available at: http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/fall01/article.asp?id=128 
Ministry of Education, China (2008), Statistical Report on National Education Development 
Affairs, Beijing: Government of China. Available at: http://www.stats.edu.cn/tjgb.aspx. 
 Ministry of Science and Technology, China (2008), Statistical Report on National Science 
and Technology Expense 2008, Beijing: Government of China. Available at: 
http://www.sts.org.cn/tjbg/tjgb/index.htm. 
Muchie, M. Gammeltoft, P. and Lundvall, B. A. (2003) Putting Africa First: The Making of 
African Innovation Systems, Aalborg, Denmark: Aalborg University Press. 
Nelson, R. R. (1993) National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nelson, R. R. (Ed) (1993) National Systems of Innovation: A Comparative Study, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
OECD (2008), Economic Outlook, No. 84, Paris: OECD. 
Oxford Analytica (2008), “Brazil: Credit crunch puts infrastructure on hold,” International 
Herald Tribune, Monday, November 03. Available at: 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/03/news/03oxan-CRUNCH.php 
Poshakwale, S. (2008), “Credit Crunch: Impact of Emerging Economies,” Interview by Steve 
Macaulay, September. Available at: 
http://www.cranfieldknowledgeinterchange.com/kihtml/topic/The%20credit%20crunch/00
91/Trascript.pdf 
 26
Prasad, R. (2004) ‘Transformation of National Innovations Systems towards the Knowledge 
Economy in a Globalised World, with Special reference to Key Industrial Sectors in India’, 
Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 392-403.  
Schumpeter, J. (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper. 
Stelzer, I. (2010), “China v world as a trade war comes closer,” Sunday Times, 14 February. 
Teje, M. (2008), “India will duck the credit crunch”, 26th March. Available at: 
http://www.realbusiness.co.uk/printable/5010871/india-will-duck-the-credit-crunch.thtml 
UNCTAD (2002) World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations and Export 
Competitiveness, New York and Geneva: UN. 
UNCTAD (2003) World Investment Report: FDI Policies for Development: National and 
International Perspectives, New York and Geneva: UN. 
UNCTAD (2004), World Investment Report: The Shift Towards Services, New York and 
Geneva: United Nations. 
UNCTAD (2005), World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations and the 
Internationalization of R&D, New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
United Nations (2009), World Economic Situation and Prospects - 2009, New York: UN. 
Veblen, T. (1919), The Place of Science in Modern Civilization and Other Essays, New York: 
Huebsch. 
Viotti, E. B. (2001) ‘National Learning Systems: A new approach on technical change in late 
industrializing economies and evidences from the cases of Brazil and Korea,’ Science, 
Technology and Innovation Discussion paper No. 12, Center for International 
Development, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
Website A: The Global Network for the Economics of Learning, Innovation, and Competence 
Building, see: http://www.globelics.org 
Website B: “China least hit by credit crunch: Credit Suisse,” 09 December 2008. See: 
http://www.mydigitalfc.com/economy/china-least-hit-credit-crunch-credit-suisse-734 
Website C: “The credit crunch has limited impact in India”, See: 
http://www.ecnasiamag.com/print.asp?id=24451 
World Bank (2005) India and the Knowledge Economy: Leveraging strengths and 
Opportunities, No. 31267 IN, World Bank Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, 
South Asia Region, April. 
Yao, S. (2009), “Hear the dragon roar as China surges”, The Daily Telegraph, 23 May. 
Zakaria, F. (2009), “The recession’s real winner: China turns crisis into opportunity”, News 
Week, 7 October. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/218282. 
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH SERIES 
WORKING PAPERS: 
 
No.   1: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing Issues in Peasant Agricultural Development, 55 pp, 1983. 
No.   2: Hans Gullestrup: The Ecol-Humanistic Technology - the new Technology as Experiences from the 
Past, 33 pp, 1983. 
No.   3: Georg Sørensen: Transnationals and the Transfer of Technology to the Third World, 31 pp, 1984. 
No.   4: Georg Sørensen: International Bureaucracies and Aid: The Political Economic of the 'B-Share', 11 
pp, 1984. 
No.   5: Georg Sørensen: Notes on Materialism and Boredom - Western Development Ideals, 12 pp, 1984. 
No.   6: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing Systems and Economic Development. An Institutional-Structural 
Approach, 41 pp, 1984. 
No.   7: Georg Sørensen: How much Poison is Another Man's Meat? - Notes on the Logic of World Systems 
Analysis, 29 pp, 1984. 
No.   8: Georg Sørensen: Peace and Development: Looking for the Right Track, 18 pp, 1984. 
No.   9: Georg Sørensen: The Twists and Turns of Development Theory - A Comment on "The European 
Experience" by Dieter Senghaas. 19 pp, 1984. 
No.  10: Jacques Hersh & Ellen Brun: Aspects of Soviet Participation in a Shifting World Economy. 45 pp, 
1984. 
No.  11: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing System Development and Labour Migration: Analysis and 
Consequences. 41 pp, 1984. 
No.  12: Georg Sørensen: How Cold is the Second Cold War? - An Assessment of the Scope of 'the Great 
Contest'. 23 pp, 1984. 
No.  13: John E. Kuada: Agricultural Development in the Third World. 23 pp, 1984. 
No.  14: Olav Jull Sørensen: Profiles of Tanzanian Peasants and their Marketing Implications. 52 pp, 1984. 
No.  15: Jørgen Kristiansen: Urban Passenger Transport in Developing Countries - Socio-economic Impact 
and the Choice of Technology. 58 pp, 1985. 
No.  16: John E. Kuada: Marketing Systems in a Development Process. 35 pp, 1985. 
No.  17: Georg Sørensen: Some Contradictions in a Rich Concept on Development. 14 pp, 1985. 
No.  18: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing of Agricultural Inputs/Implements and Profiles of Farmers in Kenya: 
Project Preparations. 47 pp, 1986. 
No.  19: Georg Sørensen: Development Through the Eyes of a Child. 17 pp, 1986. 
No.  20: Georg Sørensen: International and External Intertwined: 5 Obstacles to Development in India. 20 
pp, 1986. 
No.  21: John E. Kuada: Macro-Micro Integrated Framework for Market Opportunity Analysis and Project 
Selection. 14 pp, 1986. 
No.  22: Olav Jull Sørensen: Co-operatives: Movement-to-Movement Cooperation. Some Conceptual Views. 
15 pp, 1986. 
No.  23: John E. Kuada: Financing Rural Food Marketing Systems in Ghana. 16 pp, 1986. 
No.  24: Hans Gullestrup: Culture, Cultural Analysis and Cultural Ethics - Or What Divides and What 
Unites Us? (Out of print) (in Danish). 84 pp, 1987. 
No.  24a: Hans Gullestrup: Culture, Cultural Analysis and Cultural Ethics - Or What Divides and What 
Unites Us? (Second revised edition) (Out of print) (in Danish). 92 pp, 1988. 
No.  25: John E. Kuada: Food Marketing in Ghana, the Role of Rural Food Traders. 53 pp, 1988. 
No.  26: Henrik A. Nielsen: Monitoring Rural Development in Bangladesh. 22 pp, 1989. 
No.  27: Hans Gullestrup: The Ethical Dilemma in the Intercultural Co-operation, or: The Development Aid 
Worker=s Personal Problem (in Danish). 26 pp, 1991. 
No.  28: Chaiwoot Chaipan: Current Issues on Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia. 24 pp, 
1991. 
No.  29: Henrik Nielsen: Databased Information on Danida-Projects 1962-91: Overview and Analysis of the 
Daniproj-Database. 55 pp, 1992. 
No.  30: Hans Gullestrup: Evaluating Social Consequences of Social Changes in the Third World Countries. 
24 pp, 1993. 
No.  31: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: In The Shadow of the Pacific Century - Comparative Perspectives on 
Externalities Influence on Economic Policy-Making in Southeast Asian Would-be NICs. 106 pp, 
1993. 
No.  32: Henrik A. Nielsen: Local Community Development Around the Bay of Bengal: Context, Crises and 
Perspectives. 27 pp, 1994. 
No.  33: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Southeast Asian State Responses to a Regionalized World Economy. 
21 pp, 1994.  
No.  34: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Semi-autonomy in Economic Policy-making: The Case of Thailand. 
28 pp, 1994.  
No.  35: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Increasing Exports in a Decreasing World Market: The Role of 
Developmental States in the ASEAN-4. 27 pp, 1994.  
No.  36: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: State Capacities and Bargaining Strategies in the Global Disorder. 14 
pp, 1994. 
No.  37: Samir Amin: The Future of Global Polarization. 17 pp, 1994. 
No.  38: Peter W. Cunningham: The Re-affirmation of State Socialism. The South African Debate. 17 pp, 
1995. 
No.  39: Andre Gunder Frank: Nothing New in the East: No New World Order. 28 pp, 1994. 
No.  40: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: State Intervention in Southeast Asia. Creating Growth without 
Welfare. 20 pp, 1994. 
No.  41: Garry Rodan: Ideological Convergences Across 'East' and 'West': The New Conservative Offensive. 
24 pp, 1995. 
No.  42:  Jacques Hersh: North Korea: Ideal-Type Anomaly. 18 pp, 1995. 
No.  43: Research Centre for Development and International Relations (DIR), Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt 
et al. (eds.): Research Program 1995-1997. Globalization and Social Change - Structures, Systems 
and Unidisciplinary Research. 74 pp, 1995. 
No.  44: Feiwel Kupferberg: Ethno-nationalism, Liberal Democracy and the Psychology of the Post Cold 
War Era. 19 pp, 1995. 
No.  45: Feiwel Kupferberg: Uncertainty, Chaos and Learning: Prolegomenon to a Sociology of Creativity. 
27 pp, 1995. 
No.  46: Feiwel Kupferberg: Strategic Learning: East Germany as a "Model Case" for Transformation 
Theory. 26 pp, 1995. 
No.  47: Li Xing: China and East Asia vs. The West: Controversies, Clashes and Challenges. 19 pp, 1995. 
No.  48: Kwang-Yeong Shin: Democratization and Class Politics in Korea, 1987 - 1993. 20 pp, 1995. 
No.  49: Joachim Hirsch: Regulation Theory and its Applicability to Studies on Globalization and Social 
Change. 12 pp, 1995. 
No.  50: Ellen Brun: The New Social Contract: Sustainability from below. 20 pp, 1995. 
No.  51: Li Xing: The Dynamics of East Asian Intra-Regional Economic Relations. 22 pp, 1995. 
No.  52: Kwang-Yeong Shin: Characteristics of the East Asian Economic System: Authoritarian Capitalism 
and The Developmental State. 33 pp, 1996. 
No.  53: Li Xing: Playing Democracy and Human Rights. The International System and the China-West 
Case. 17 pp, 1996. 
No.  54: Jacques Hersh & Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Dirigisme or Laissez-Faire? - Catching-up 
Strategies in the Global System After the Demise of Soviet-Style Command Economies. 22 pp, 
1996. 
No.  55: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt & Jacques Hersh: Peace Convergence and Political Legitimacy in 
Israel and Palestine. 16 pp, 1997. 
No.  56: David Harvey: Globalization in Question. 22 pp, 1997. 
No.  57: Amiya Kumar Bagchi: In Praise of the Developmental State. 35 pp, 1997. 
No.  58: Su-Hoon Lee: The Rise of Environmentalism in South Korea. 31 pp, 1997. 
No.  59: Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya: The Politics of Regionalism: APEC and the EU in 
Comparative Perspective. 37 pp, 1997. 
No.  60: Manfred Bienefeld: The State and Civil Society: The Political Economy of the ANew Social 
Policy@. 35 pp, 1997. 
No.  61: Duncan McCargo: Problematising Democratisation: The Thai Case. 22 pp, 1997. 
No.  62: Li Xing: Conceptualizing the Crisis of Socialism: A Gramscian Approach. Some Reflections on the 
Chinese Socialist Experience. 41 pp, 1998. 
No.  63: Henrik A. Nielsen: Decentralising the Monitoring of Development Intervention: From Local 
Government Impact-Monitoring. 116 pp, 1998. 
No.  64: Suresh Narayanan: From Miracle to Realities: The Malaysian Economy in Crisis.  26 pp, 1998. 
No.  65: Li Xing, Jacques Hersh & Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: The Rise and Fall of East Asian 
Capitalism: Back to the future? 30 pp, 1998. 
No.  66: Jan Oberg: Globalization and Responses by Civil Society to Humanitarian Emergencies. 44 pp, 
1998. 
No.  67: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Development Theory and the Crisis of the State. 30 pp, 1998. 
No.  68:  Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Jacques Hersh and Li Xing (eds.) and members of DIR: Research 
Program 1998-2000 Globalization and Social Change Interdisciplinary Critical Perspectives. 81 pp, 
1998. 
No.  69: Katarina Tomaševski: Human Rights in International Development Co-operation: Between Politics 
and Policy. 69 pp, 1999. 
No.  70: Mammo Muchie: Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Renewal in the Era of Globalisation. 32 pp, 
1999. 
No.  71: Wolfgang Sachs: Globalization and Sustainability. 38 pp, 1999. 
No.  72: Xing Li: The Market Approach to Industrialization: A Critique of China´s Experiment. 37 pp, 1999. 
No.  73: Bob Jessop: The State and the Contradictions of the Knowledge-Driven Economy. 37 pp, 1999. 
No.  74: Bob Jessop: What follows Fordism? On the Periodization of Capitalism and its Regulation. 36 pp, 
1999. 
No.  75:  Mammo Muchie: Climbing the Value-Added Chain in Leather Manufacture: Lessons from the Indian 
Case to Enhance Value-Added Leather Processing in Ethiopia and Kenya. 26 pp, 2000.  
No.  76:  Stanislav Menshikov: Macropolicies to Help Re-Start Economic Growth in Russia. 44 pp, 2000. 
No.  77:  Stanislav Menshikov: Indicators and Trends of Economic Globalisation. 26 pp, 2000. 
No.  78:  Stanislav Menshikov: The Role of International Capital Flows: How to Reduce the Vulnerability of 
the Global Economy. 23 pp, 2000. 
No.  79: Mammo Muchie: The Way Africa Entered The Millennium: Trousers and Skirts down or Head 
High: A Commentary. 19 pp, 2000. 
No.  80: Manfred Bienefeld: Globalisation and Social Change: Drowning in the Icy Waters of Commercial 
Calculation. 48 pp, 2000. 
No.  81: Mammo Muchie: From Protest to Sanitation: Critical Reflections on the UN´s Discourse of 
Environmentally friendly Technologies. 24 pp, 2000. 
No.  82: Jacques Hersh: Globalization and Regionalization: Two Facets of One Process. 22 pp, 2000. 
No.  83: Mammo Muchie: Towards a Theory for Re-framing Pan-Africanism: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come. 30 pp, 2000. 
No.  84: Rajah Rasiah: From Dragons to Dwarfs: Reexamining Neo-Liberal Explanations of the Southeast 
Asian Financial Crisis. 23 pp, 2000. 
No.  85: Jacques Hersh: The Constraints of World Capitalism in Catching up. 35 pp, 2000. 
No.  86: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Political Business as Usual-Comparing Public-Private Partnerships in 
East and Southeast Asia. 22 pp, 2000. 
No.  87: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Democratization and Social Welfare in Thailand. 23 pp, 2000. 
No.  88: Mammo Muchie: The Uptake of Environmentally Sensitive Innovation in Production in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 19 pp, 2000. 
No.  89: Mammo Muchie: Imagining Ethiopia Betyond War and Poverty: The two-year war between two 
strategic allies in the Horn of Africa. 34 pp, 2000.  
No.  90: Susanne Thorbek: Beyond Equal Rights. 25 pp, 2000. 
No.  91: Timothy M. Shaw: Development Studies at the Start of the New Millennium in South and North. 18 
pp, 2000. 
No.  92: Jane L. Parpart: Rethinking Participatory Empowerment, gender and development: The PRA 
Approach. 24 pp, 2000. 
No.  93: Timothy M. Shaw: Contemporary Conflicts in Africa: implications for development studies/policies. 
36 pp, 2000. 
No.  94: Andre Gunder Frank: ReOrient Histography and Social Theory. 41 pp, 2000 
No.  95: Howard Stein: The Development of the Developmental State in Africa: A Theoretical Inquiry. 30 
pp, 2000. 
No.  96: Li Xing and Jacques Hersh: Understanding Capitalism: Crises and Passive Revolutions. 35 pp, 
2001. 
No.  97: Jiang Shixue: Reflections from Comparative Studies Of the Development Models in Latin America 
and East Asia.  15 pp, 2001. 
No.  98: Jiang Shixue: Sino-Latin American Relations: Retrospect and Prospects. 21 pp, 2001. 
No.  99: Peter Wad: Social Development in East Asia: Warfare, Workfare, Welfare? 51 pp, 2001. 
No. 100: Peadar Kirby: Is the Irish state developmental? 28 pp, 2001. 
No. 101: Elmar Altvater: The Growth Obsession. 28 pp, 2001. 
No. 102: Berhanu Gutema Balcha: Food Insecurity in Ethiopia: the Impact of Socio-political Forces. 17 pp, 
2001. 
No. 103: Marianne H. Marchand: Gendering  Globalization in an Era of Transnational Capital: New Cross-
border Alliances and Strategies of Resistance in a Post-NAFTA Mexico. 21 pp, 2001. 
No. 104: Ravindra Kumar: Gandhi: Non-violence and Indian Democracy. 9 pp, 2002. 
No. 105: Mammo Muchie: The New Partnership for African Development (Nepad): A False or a True Start 
for Shaping Africa’s Decolonised Future? 10 pp, 2002. 
No. 106: Vibeke Andersson: Indigenous Authority and State Policy: Popular participation in two villages in 
rural Bolivia. 19 pp, 2002. 
No. 107: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Rethinking the Nexus between Development Theory and IR: From 
Old Divisions to New Encounters. 23 pp, 2004. 
No. 108: Louise Takeda: The Emancipatory Potential of Ecological Economics: A Thermodynamic 
Perspective on Economics, Space and Sustainability. 95 pp, 2002. 
No. 109: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: No Middle Road Capitalism: The Impact of the Uniform Policy-
regime in Eastern Europe and East Asia. 23 pp, 2004. 
No. 110: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Confronting Globalization through Social Reform in East and 
Southeast Asia. 26 pp, 2004. 
No. 111: Johan Galtung: A World in Economic Crisis. 33 pp, 2002. 
No. 112: Kristen Nordhaug: US Hegemony, Economic Integration and Monetary Regionalism in East Asia. 
33 pp, 2002. 
No. 113: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia. 23 pp, 2004. 
No. 114:    Rajah Rasiah: The Competitive Impact of China on Southeast Asia’s Labor Markets. 37 pp, 2002. 
No. 115:  Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Crisis Management in Thailand: The Ambivalence of “New” 
Keynesian Responce. 27 pp, 2003. 
No. 116:  Annette Kanstrup-Jensen: Constraints on Capability Formation of Indigenous Communities: The 
Case of Human Development among Akha and Hmong Groups in South East Asia. 22 pp, 2003. 
No. 117: Li Xing & Mammo Muchie: Globalization and  Social Well-being Alternative Approach to Well-
being Attainment and Measurement. 22 pp, 2003.  
No. 118: Bjørn Møller: Raising armies in a rough neighbourhood. The Military and Militarism in Southern 
Africa. 45 pp, 2003. 
No. 119: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Making capitalism work: The dubious dichotomy between welfare 
and workfare. 24 pp, 2003. 
No. 120: Bjørn Møller: African conflicts: Background factors, motives and patterns. 92 pp, 2003. 
No. 121: Li Xing & Jacques Hersh: The Genesis of capitalism. 30 pp, 2003. 
No. 122: Bjørn Møller: Conflict theory. 68 pp, 2003. 
No. 123: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Reflections on human rights and the new US world disorder. 15 pp, 
2004. 
No. 124  Bjørn Møller: Aid against terrorism. 19 pp, 2003. 
No. 125 Timothy Shaw: Two Africas? Two Ugandas? An African ‘Democratic Developmental State’?  Or 
Another ‘Failed State’? 24 pp, 2004. 
No. 126 Jane Parpart: Gender, Power and Governance in a Globalizing World. 16 pp, 2004. 
No. 127 Bjørn Møller: Peace as A Global Public Good. 35 pp, 2004. 
No. 128 Ananta Kumar Giri: A Moral Critique of Development: Ethics, Aesthetics and Responsibility. 33 
pp, 2004. 
No. 129 Peadar Kirby: Is Globalisation Good for Us? Introducing the Concept of Vulnerability. 46 pp, 2004. 
No. 130 Malee M. Lang: Management of the Mekong River Basin: Contesting its sustainability from a 
communication Perspective. 27 pp, 2004. 
No. 131 Elmar Altvater: Globalization and the informalization of the urban space. 18 pp, 2004. 
No. 132 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Civil Society at the Crossroads in Southeast Asia. 28 pp, 2004. 
No. 133 Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Flexicurity, Casualisation and Informalisation of Global Labour 
Markets. 24 pp, 2005. 
No. 134 Ananta Kumar Giri: Creative Social Research: Rethinking Theories and Methods and the Calling of 
an Ontological Epistemology of Participation. 43 pp, 2005. 
No. 135 Bengt-Aake Lundvall: Nation states, social capital and economic development – a system’s approach 
to knowledge creation and learning. 21 pp, 2006. 
No. 136 Annette Kanstrup-Jensen: Indigenous Education and Knowledge – a delegitimised Concept in the 
Education for All Strategies. 28 pp, 2006. 
No. 137 Mammo Muchie, Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee: African Integration and civil society: The 
case of the African Union. 22 pp, 2006. 
No. 138 Li Xing & Woodrow W. Clark: Globalization and the Next Economy: A Theoretical and Critical 
Review. 19 pp, 2007.  
No. 139 Minga Negash: Accountability, the APRM State and Traditional Polity: The Case of Ethiopia. 23 
pp, 2007. 
No. 140 LI Jizhen and LI Xing: Cultural Differences and Process Adaption in International R&D Project 
Management: The Case of Alcatel-Lucent China Research Technology Center. 19 pp, 2009. 
No. 141 Paul Popku-Mensah: China and the International Aid System: Challenges and Opportunities. 16 pp, 
2009. 
No. 142 Jacques Hersh and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Food Crisis and the Structure of Trade, 25 pp, 
2010. 
No. 143 Li Xing and Woodrow W. Clark: Energy Concern in China’s Policy-Making Calculation: From Self-
reliance, Market-dependence to Green Energy. 20 pp, 2010. 
No. 144 Shamima Nasrin, Angathevar Baskaran and Mammo Muchie: A Study of Major Determinants and 
Hindrances of FDI inflow in Bangladesh. 24pp, 2010. 
No. 145 Ju Liu, Angathevar Baskaran and Mammo Muchie: Global Recession and the National System of 
Innovation in China: ‘A Blessing in Disguise’? 26pp, 2010. 
